I. INTRODUCTION
In Degen v. United States,' the United States Supreme Court addressed whether to expand the fugitive disentitlement doctrine 2 beyond its traditional criminal appeals setting to the context of civil forfeiture. 3 The Court unanimously ruled that a person who is a fugitive from justice on a criminal charge is not barred from defending against a civil action brought by the Government to confiscate his property. 4 In refusing to extend the doctrine to the civil forfeiture setting, the Court stated that the federal district courts' inherent powers to retain control and respect for the judicial branch do not justify imposition of the severe sanction of disentitlement. 5 This Note reviews the concept of the "inherent powers" of the federal courts and examines the development and evolution of the fugitive disentitlement principle. 6 This Note argues that Degen correctly discounted the various justifications advanced by courts for invoking the disentitlement doctrine in the civil forfeiture context. Furthermore, the Court properly concluded that those objectives do not outv eigh the harsh and arbitrary results that application of the rule in civil forfeiture effects. This Note also argues, however, that the Court minimized the due process implications of its decision, as well as notions of basic fairness. In so doing, the Court avoided the essential issue-namely, the need to check the unlimited power of the Government and the federal courts wielded under the ruse of efficient and dignified judicial operations. Consequently, this Note concludes, the Court's opinion in Degen is ultimately an unsatisfying and vague exigesis on the broad discretion afforded the federal courts in apply-case in error, unless the convicted party, suing out the writ, is where he can be made to respond to any judgment we may render." 2 6 Confronting this issue again in Bonahan v. Nebraska, 27 the Court followed Smith and refused to consider an appeal where the accused was not within the jurisdiction of the Court due to his escape from custody. 28 The Court ordered that the case be set aside and remain off the trial court's docket unless the accused was brought before the trial court before its term ended. 2 9 In Allen v. Georgia, 3 0 the Court affirmed the rationale for dismissal of a criminal appeal conceived in Smith and further developed in Bonahan. 3 1 The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of a defendant's appeal from a murder conviction and death sentence, thereby supporting the lower court's reasoning that his escape from justice essentially eliminated his right to prosecute a writ of error. 3 2 To do otherwise would enable the defendant to dictate to the court the terms of his surrender-"a contempt of [the court's] authority, to which no court is bound to submit." The Supreme Court continued to invoke the enforceability justification in support of disentitlement 4 while developing additional reasons for the doctrine. In Molinaro v. New Jersey, 3 5 the Court refused to adjudicate the appeal of a convicted abortionist who failed to surrender himself to authorities after he was released on bail.
3 6 The Court held that " [w] hile such an escape does not strip the case of its character as an adjudicable case or controversy, we believe it disentitles the defendant to call upon the resources of the Court for determination of his claims." 3 7 This decision simultaneously affirmed the principles 32 See id. at 141 (rejecting defendant's contention that dismissal constituted denial of due process: "We cannot say that dismissal of a writ of error is notjustified by the abandonment of his case by the plaintiff in the writ. By escaping from legal custody he has... thereby abandoned his right to prosecute a writ of error. . . 33 
Id.
34 See, e.g., Eisler v. United States, 338 U.S. 189, 190 (1949) (per curiam) (following Smith and Bonahan in ordering a petition for certiorari to be removed from docket after petitioner became a fugitive from justice).
35 396 U.S. 365 (1970) (per curiam). 36 Id. at 366. Dismissing the appeal, the Court stated, "[nJo persuasive reason exists why this Court should proceed to adjudicate the merits of a criminal case after the convicted defendant who has sought review escapes from the restraints placed upon him pursuant to the conviction." Id. In Estelle v. Dorrough, 3 9 the Court voiced still other justifications for the fugitive disentitlement doctrine: promoting the dignified operation of the appellate courts and deterring felony escape. 40 In response to an equal protection claim, 4 1 the Court upheld a Texas statute 42 mandating automatic dismissal of an appeal where the defendant has escaped while the appeal is pending. 43 In so doing, the Court stated that the statute met its intended goals of discouraging escape and encouraging voluntary surrender to authorities. 44 Furthermore, the statute promoted "the efficient, dignified operation of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals."
45

C. DISENTITLEMENT IN THE CIVIL CONTEXT
The Supreme Court has not extended Molinaro to civil matters relating to a criminal fugitive. However, the Court's decision in Molinaro did not indicate whether application of the disentitlement doctrine should be restricted to criminal cases. In fact, many federal appellate courts have claimed that the doctrine should apply with greater force in civil cases where an individual's liberty is notjeopard- Our decisions have universally been understood to mean only that a court may properly dismiss an appeal of a fugitive convict, when, and because, he is not within the custody and control of the court.... Until today, this Court has never intimated that under the rule of Smith, Bonahan, and Molinaro a court might dismiss an appeal of an escaped criminal defendant at a time when he has been returned to custody, and thus to the court's power and control .... Id. at 543 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
41 The statute only applies to those prisoners with appeals pending at the time of their escape, treating them differently from those who first escaped from custody, returned and then invoked the appellate process in a timely manner. Id. at 541.
42 The Texas statute provides for automatic dismissal of a pending appeal by an escaped felon upon escape. However, the court shall order reinstatement of the appeal if the defendant voluntarily surrenders within ten days of his escape. See TEx. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 44.09 (West 1966) .
43 Estelle, 420 U.S. at 541 (ruling that Texas was free to impose more severe sanctions upon "those who simultaneously invoked the appellate process and escaped from its custody... [and] whose escape is reasonably calculated to disrupt the very appellate process which they themselves have set in motion."). 5 3 the First Circuit rejected the disentitlement concept that a fugitive is precluded from appealing a decision ordering forfeiture.54 Reversing the lower court's decision, the First Circuit ruled that the civil case was not "closely related" to the criminal matter from which the claimant was a fugitive. 5 5 More importantly, the court stated that, although the defendant was technically a claimant, his action was "more in the nature of a re- 
Circuit Applications of the Disentitlement Doctrine
Despite the reluctance of the First 5 9 and Sixth Circuits, many courts have readily accepted the sufficiency of Molinaro and its progeny to bar claims in forfeiture cases where a claimant to the defendant property is a fugitive from justice in a related criminal proceeding.
60
These courts have held that such a claimant should not be permitted to defend against the forfeiture because he has flouted the authority of the court and thus has waived his right to due process.
In 1984, the Second Circuit confronted a situation involving a single claimant in which the Government sought to dismiss only the fugitive's claim, without prejudice to any other potential claimant. Thus distinguishing $45,940 from $83,320, the Second Circuit became the first court to extend the Molinaro disentitlement doctrine to a civil forfeiture proceeding. 62 In $45,940, McKay, a Canadian, was arrested, jailed and deported for illegally entering into the United States from Canada. 63 The $45,940 in U.S. currency he carried at the time of arrest was seized, and he was subsequently indicted for making a false statement to the U.S. Customs Service regarding the amount of 56 Id. at 643.
57
See id. The court noted that one of the main considerations in the fugitive from justice cases is "the fact that the fugitive is trying... to reap the benefit of the judicial process without subjecting himself to an adverse determination." Id. In the case at bar, the claimant was not appealing a conviction; the Government seized his property and would hold it forfeit if he did not respond. The First Circuit explained, "'[P]etitioner's position is more analogous to that of a defendan for it belatedly challenges the government's action by now protesting against a seizure and seeking the recovery of assets.'" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U. S. 197, 210 (1958) ).
58 Id. at 644 (noting that the "core concept in ... [this] doctrine seems to be that the courts need not act on behalf of an individual who has attempted to bring about the same result by 'self-help' method of escaping from justice").
59 Note that the First Circuit has extended the application of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine in a criminal appeal to a civil appeal. See United States ex rel Bailey v. United States Commanding Officer of the Office of the Provost Marshal, 496 F.2d 324, 326 (1st Cir. 1974) (affirming dismissal of action wherein petitioner seeking relief from Army regulation through writ of habeas corpus was absent without leave; petitioner could not "invoke the processes of the law while flouting them ... [and] 77 reiterating its recognition of the applicability of the disentitlement doctrine in the civil arena. 78 The court held that where the defendant property had allegedly been used to facilitate the commission of a crime (narcotics trafficking), and the property owner had fled justice after being indicted for that crime, the doctrine precluded the fugitive from raising objections to the forfeiture. 79 In United States v. Eng, 0 the Second Circuit again applied the disentitlement doctrine to a civil forfeiture action. 8 ' Specifically, the court declared that it is irrelevant which party initiates the proceedings in question; regardless of a fugitive's procedural posture, his fugitive status bars any defense. 8 
The Circuit Split and Recent Supreme Court Rulings
Against this backdrop, the Seventh Circuit resisted the progressive expansion of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. 8 7 In $40,877.59, the court stated that allowing a district court to use the doctrine in civil forfeitures would "sweep far too broadly." 8 8 In a comparison between a fugitive-claimant where the disentitlement rule has been applied and a party in contempt of court, the Seventh Circuit remarked that both are "punished for 'flouting' the authority of a court in another proceeding." 8 9 The fugitive's punishment is preclusion from procedural self-defense, a penalty which may be a violation of due process. 90 The Seventh Circuit found this outcome unacceptable: "notwithstanding an individual's status, where he is vulnerable to being sued, he has the right to defend himself in the action brought against him .... 91 Prior to $40,877.59, the majority of circuit courts held that a fugitive claimant in a civil forfeiture action was flouting the judicial system and was not entitled to due process. 9 2 The ruling in $40,877.59 created a split in authority regarding the right of the fugitive to defend confiscated property.
As discussed below, the Seventh Circuit's approach reflected the Supreme Court's changing attitude towards forfeiture and the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. Recent decisions indicate a retreat from the Supreme Court's prior expansive treatment of the lower courts' application of the rule in civil forfeiture proceedings. For example, the Supreme Court recently held the disentitlement doctrine inapplicable where a defendant flees after conviction (while a criminal case is pending in the district court) but is recaptured before the filing of an appeal. 94 In its fullest discussion to date, the Court enumerated the underlying principles of the doctrine 95 and explalned that these are necessarily attenuated where the defendant's fugitive status at no time coincides with the appeal. 96 The Court found that none of these rationales justified disentitling the defendant in Ortega-Rodriguez. 9 7 More importantly, the Court rejected any expansion of the doctrine "that would allow an appellate court to sanction by dismissal any conduct that exhibited disrespect for any aspect of the judicial system." 98
III. DEGEv V. UNITED STA=r FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 24, 1989, 9 9 a federal grand jury in the District of Nevada indicted Brian J. Degen for distributing marijuana, organizing and running a massive marijuana trafficking operation, laundering money, and additional related crimes.' 0 0 That same day, the United States District Court for the District of Nevada unsealed a complaint filed by the Government in a civil forfeiture action against Degen's real and personal property, bank accounts, property income, and business interests. 1°1 Invoking 21 U.S.C. § § 881 (a) (6) & (7),102 the forfeiture actions).
94 Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 U.S. at 251. 95 The Court identified four justifications for disentitling a fugitive litigant on appeal: enforceability concerns; the "disentitlement" theory; deterrence; and advancement of interests in efficient, dignified appellate practice. Id. at 240-42.
96 Id. at 244. 102 The statute reads as follows: § 881. Forfeitures (a) The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property right shall exist in them:
(6) All moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled substance in violation of this subchapter, all proceeds traceable to such an exchange, and all moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of this subchapter, except that no property shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent of the interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner.
(7) All real property, including any right, title, and interest (including any leasehold interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances or improve-Government sought to seize property in California, Nevada, and Hawaii, estimated to be worth $5.5 million and allegedly purchased with or used to facilitate the proceeds of Degen's drug sales.
10 3
The Government submitted the affidavit of Drug Enforcement Administration Special Agent Dennis A. Cameron in support of the forfeiture complaint. 1 0 4 The supporting affidavit asserted that the property was traceable to the criminal drug offenses. 1 0 5 It also described an extensive smuggling operation involving tens of thousands of pounds of marijuana from Mexico and Thailand and Degen's alleged involvement in the subsequent distribution of the drugs in California and Nevada from 1969 to 1986.106 Cameron also alleged in the affidavit that Degen's total adjusted gross income for the period between 1979 and 1986 was less than $250,000, while accounting records showed a net worth of $2.1 million. 1 0 7 The affidavit relied heavily on information obtained from confidential informants. Degen's father was born in Switzerland, and, consequently, Brian maintained both Swiss and United States citizenship. 1 0 9 Before the grand jury returned its indictment of Degen, but after authorities arrested an alleged co-conspirator, Degen left the United States and moved to Switzerland with his family.' 1 0 After his indictment, Degen failed to return to the United States to face the criminal charges in Nevada. 1 1 ' Additionally, the United States Government could not force Degen's return due to the extradition treaty between Switzerland and the United States, which does not mandate that either country extradite its own nationals." denied any connection between the property sought to be forfeited and activities of the charged criminal enterprise. 1 1 4 He contended that the Government's claims were barred by the statute of limitations and based on an unlawful retroactive application of the forfeiture laws. 1 15 Degen also challenged the legality of the ex parte seizure of his property, arguing that the complaint and affidavit did not establish probable cause.
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On May 2, 1990, the Government moved to strike the Degens' claims and answers, and moved for summary judgment.'
17 The Government asserted that Degen was not entitled to be heard in the civil forfeiture action as long as he remained a fugitive from justice in the related criminal case. 1 8 In response, Degen's attorneys argued first that Degen was not a fugitive because he had not left the country with the intent to avoid prosecution; and second, that the properties seized by the Government had been purchased with income from the Degens' various real estate and construction ventures over the years, not with money from illegal drug transactions." 9 The district court denied the Government's motion against Karyn Degen. 20 However, the court granted the Government summary judgment against Brian, stating that "an intent to avoid prosecution (conferring the 'fugitive status') may be inferred where the defendant knows that he is wanted by the police and fails to submit to arrest." 121 According to the district court, Brian Degen was aware that the police sought him and still refused to submit to arrest-therefore, he was a fugitive.' 22 Having designated Degen a fugitive, the court addressed whether the disentitlement doctrine precluded him from contesting the related civil forfeiture action.' 23 As part of its inquiry into whether the disentitlement doctrine applied, the court enumerated five guiding factors: (1) the underlying policy of the disentitlement doctrine; (2) the degree to which the property in the forfeiture action related to the criminal acts; (3) the claimant's control over his fugitive status; (4) whether the claimant is a defendant or a plaintiff; and (5) whether the Government obtained a prior criminal conviction against the claimant. 12 8 Considering all of these factors, the district court held that the disentitlement doctrine should extend beyond $129,374 to apply to Degen's case. 12 9 Despite the fact that he had not been convicted, Degen was nonetheless barred from defending the civil forfeiture in absentia. 130 Two years later, in December 1992, the Government moved again for summary judgment, this time against Karyn Degen alone. 13 Affirming the district court on appeal, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the criminal action and the civil forfeiture action were "closely enough connected to satisfy any relatedness test," 13 7 and that the case necessitated an extension of the disentitlement doctrine. 3 Although Degen had not been convicted or even tried criminally, 3 9 the appellate court ruled that he had "'demonstrated disrespect' for the district court by refusing to submit to its jurisdiction in the criminal action." 40 The Ninth Circuit found harmless error in the district court's failure to consider whether application of the disentitlement doctrine should be subject to judicial discretion.' 41 Though Degen did not argue the issue on appeal, 142 the Ninth Circuit emphasized in its ruling that "the doctrine is discretionary, not mandatory." 143 Degen petitioned for rehearing but the Ninth Circuit denied the petition.' 4 Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari'45 to determine whether a United States District Court may strike a claimant's filings in a civil forfeiture suit and grant summary judgment against the claimant for failing to appear in a related criminal prosecution.46
IV.
SUMMARY OF OPINION
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.' 47 Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Kennedy concluded that the fugitive disentitlement doctrine does not permit a district court to enter judgment against a fugitive claimant in a civil forfeiture action on the ground that the claimant failed to return to the United States to defend against federal drug charges.' 48 Specifically, Justice Kennedy stated that imposition of the doctrine in Degen's case was unjustified, notwithstanding the inherent power of the federal courts. 149 The doc- trine, as applied by the district court, constituted an "arbitrary response" to Degen's conduct that served to advance no substantial interest of the district court.
0
Declining to extend the doctrine, 151 Justice Kennedy admonished that the "inherent authority" of the federal courts to protect their proceedings and uphold their judgments must be restricted. 152 Otherwise, "there is a danger of overreaching when one branch of the Government, without benefit of cooperation or correction from the others, undertakes to define its own authority."' u5 Courts should exercise restraint when resorting to that inherent power and its use must be a "reasonable response to the problems and needs that provoke it"1154 Turning to a discussion of the underlying rationales, Justice Kennedy explained the reasons the Court had provided in the past when applying the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. 155 First, when a fugitive cannot be located, there may be no means of enforcing a court's judgment on review. 156 According to Justice Kennedy, this was the operative philosophy of Smith v. United States,' 57 the first case to recognize the doctrine. 5 8 Second, the fugitive is not entitled "to call upon the resources of the Court for determination of his claims"' 59 -i.e., his escape from justice disentitles him. 160 Other and other precedents did not support dismissal of a fugitive's appeal when the fugitive was recaptured before the appeal was filed.' 6 5 According to Justice Kennedy, the Court in Ortega-Rodriguez gave considerable weight to the fact that the appellate court could enforce its judgment against the appellant regardless of his absence, and that the appellant's earlier absence from custody "did not threaten the dignity of the court imposing the sanction."' 6 6 A similar examination of Degen's situation resulted in the Court's determination that disentitlement was unjustified. 6 7 Not only was there no risk of delay or frustration in analyzing the merits of the Government's forfeiture case against Degen, but there would have been no problems in enforcing the resulting judgment.1 6 8
Furthermore, while the Court acknowledged the Government's fear that Degen's participation in the civil case would compromise the criminal prosecution, 6 9 it determined that this fear failed to justify resorting to the disentitlement rule. 170 Justice Kennedy felt that the district court could employ less extreme methods of resolving this dilemma, such as entering protective orders limiting discovery or managing the civil litigation to avoid interference with the criminal case. 17 1 In addition, Justice Kennedy reasoned, if Degen's reluctance to appear resulted in non-compliance with a court order, the trial court could impose any of the sanctions reserved for uncooperative parties, including contempt or dismissal, if appropriate. 172 Without specifying which scheme the district court should adopt, Justice Kennedy stated that, "[tihe existence of these alternative means of protecting the Government's interests.., shows the lack of necessity for 163 507 U.S. 234 (1993). (1993)). 166 Id.
Id.
168 Id.
169
Id. at 1782. The Government asserted that Degen might utilize the more liberal rules of civil discovery in the forfeiture suit to gain an improper advantage in the criminal action, where, as a criminal defendant, he is entitled to only limited discovery. This problem can normally be avoided by staying the civil proceeding until the prosecution is completed. Clearly, that avenue is foreclosed due to Degen's departure from the country and refusal to return. Moreover, it would be prejudicial to the Government to stay the forfeiture indefinitely, since if its forfeiture claims are valid, it is entitled to immediate possession of the properties. Id. 
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SUPREME COURT REVIEW the harsh sanction of absolute disentitlement." 173 Justice Kennedy then considered and rejected the other purposes advanced in support of the disentitlement doctrine. 174 According to Justice Kennedy, the need the need to redress the indignity suffered by the district court in the face of Degen's absence from the criminal proceeding and to deter similar flights from prosecution were insufficient to outweigh the severity of disentitlement. 175 In fact, resorting too quickly to a rule that essentially forecloses consideration of the merits of a claim may have the opposite effect of eroding the dignity a court derives from the respect accorded its judgments.
176
Justice Kennedy admitted "disquiet at the spectacle of a criminal defendant reposing in Switzerland, beyond the reach of our criminal courts, while at the same time mailing papers to the court in a related civil action and expecting them to be honored." 7 7 He determined, however, that the sanction of disentitlement was arbitrary and excessive. 178 "A court's inherent power is limited by the necessity giving rise to its exercise," andJustice Kennedy concluded that Degen's case presented no such necessity to justify forbidding all participation by the absent claimant.
V. ANALYSis
This Note acknowledges that the outcome in Degen was proper. However, this Note asserts that the Supreme Court did not go far enough. The Court should have proscribed the extension of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine outside its traditional, equitable application in criminal appellate cases. Specifically, the doctrine should have no role in civil forfeiture actions initiated by the Government against a fugitive-i.e., where the fugitive is the claimant. This Note argues that such an application is an affront to the Due Process Clause' 8 0 because it denies the claimant the right to defend the litigation and it deprives him of property without any hearing whatsoever. In addition, as employed in civil forfeitures, disentitlement offends notions of basic fairness and has no valid countervailing considerations. In an irresolute opinion, the Degen Court overlooked the due process ramifi- 
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cations and the equity concerns arising from the doctrine's use in such actions. Consequently, the Court failed to rein in the Government's overreaching and random invocation of the doctrine, and, in the end, forfeited the opportunity to halt the invasive expansion of the doctrine by the federal courts.
A. DUE PROCESS
The Supreme Court devoted one sentence to the issue of due process and the fugitive disentitlement doctrine in Degen.' 8 ' Perhaps this seemingly short analysis is a result of the curious absence in lower court fugitive disentitlement decisions of any due process analysis. Interestingly enough, though many of the lower courts have adopted the doctrine in civil forfeiture actions, only one has addressed its implications on due process rights. 182 Essentially, the courts that favor disentitlement in the forfeiture setting have based their rulings on the Second Circuit's decision in United States v. $45,940.183 In that case, the Second Circuit chose to further extend the Molinaro principle from criminal appeals to civil forfeiture. 1 8 4 One commentator noted that the courts "rely heavily on each other's decisions in applying the disentitlement doctrine. After [the Second Circuit] applied the Molinaro standard, the others simply followed suit, without regard for constitutional issues such as whether due process requires a bipartisan hearing."' 8 5
The Due Process Right to Defend
Until Degen, the Supreme Court had not reviewed any civil forfei-181 Degen, 116 S. Ct. at 1780. Justice Kennedy cited one of the Court's prior decisions for the basic proposition that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees a citizen the "right to a hearing to contest the forfeiture of his property." Id. (citing United States v. James Daniel Good, 510 U.S. 43, 51 (1993)). Beyond that mere mention, the Court effectively declined to discuss the matter: "We need not, and do hot, intimate a view on whether enforcement of a disentitlement rule under proper authority would violate due process." Id. at 1783. It is difficult to fathom why the Court felt it unnecessary to address this question, particularly since the Court stopped short of declaring that a federal court's "proper authority" does not include barring a fugitive from defending himself in a related civil forfeiture action. 189 the Court identified the right to defend as an independent due process right:
To say that courts have inherent power to deny all right to defend an action and to render decrees without any hearing whatever is, in the very nature of things, to convert the court exercising such an authority into an instrument of wrong and oppression, and hence to strip it of that attribute ofjustice upon which the exercise ofjudicial power necessarily depends.' 9 0 The Hovey ruling declared that striking an answer and condemning by default as punishment for contempt of court was a denial of due process of law.' 9 '
In accordance with the foundations of due process, an individual "must be permitted to defend himself in any court where his antagonist can appear and prosecute." 9 2 This right of defense attaches in civil and criminal cases, and belongs to every person, whether he has violated the laws or not.' 9 3 In light of this, "the right to answer a seizure of property is analogous to the right to answer charges as 186 See McVeigh v. United States, 78 U.S. (1 Wall.) 259 (1870) (reversing district court's order to strike claim and answer in forfeiture action where respondent was an 'alien enemy' (a Confederate office holder); order effectively denied respondent a hearing). See also Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 277 (1876) ("This is a principal of natural justice .... A sentence of a court pronounced against a party without hearing him, or giving him an opportunity to be heard, is not ajudicial determination of his rights, and is not entitled to respect in any other tribunal.").
187 McVeigh, 78 U.S. at 267. 188 Id. ("Whatever may be the extent of the disability of an alien enemy to sue in the courts of the hostile country, it is clear that he is liable to be sued, and this carries with it the right to use all the means and appliances of defence [sic] ."). See also Windsor, 93 U.S. at 277 ("Wherever one is assailed in his person or property, there he may defend.").
189 167 U.S. 409 (1897) (involving British subject as defendant who refused to comply with order to pay into court registry money, right to which was at issue in case). 191 Id. That is not to deny that courts may render a defaultjudgment on certain occasions, for example, for failure to answer or to produce evidence or similar significant infringements on judicial proceedings. In those instances, the preservation of due process is secured by the presumption that the refusal to respond or produce is an "admission of the want of merit in the asserted defense." Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322, 350-51 (1909 Where a court invokes disentitlement in a civil forfeiture suit, the claimant is haled into court only to be denied the opportunity to defend against the Government's demands for his property. As a result, the claimant's due process right to assert a defense is summarily extinguished. In Degen, the claimant was threatened with the loss of $5.5 million worth of property to the Government. When he attempted through counsel to challenge these Government advances, the lower courts denied him that right.
In such a setting, the disentitlement doctrine becomes but a thinly veiled excuse for punishment for an offense having no relation to the merits of the government's claims or the claimant's defense. The Court should draw a bright line at civil forfeiture. By failing to do so in Degen, the Court averted its eyes from the continuing erosion of basic constitutional rights, among which the due process right to defend is foremost. 
Procedural Due Process
Not only does disentitlement in civil forfeiture actions fatally restrict the right to defend, but it also strips the claimant of his constitutional right to a hearing on the matter. 19 7 The Supreme Court has interpreted the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause as imposing 194 Collins, supra note 38, at 642. 195 Id. There is no significant procedural distinction between an individual found in contempt of court and a fugitive-claimant in a civil forfeiture case: both have allegedly defied the authority of a court in another proceeding and either "status" may act to bar a potential suit. See United States v. $40,877.59 in United States Currency, 32 F.3d 1151, 1154 (7th Cir. 1994).
196 As the Court noted in Hovey If the power to violate the fundamental constitutional safeguards securing the property exists, and if they may be with impunity set aside by courts on the theory that they do not apply to proceedings in contempt, why will they not also apply to proceedings against the liberty of the subject; Why should not a court in a criminal proceeding deny to the accused all right to be heard, on the theory that he is in contempt, and sentence him to the full penalty of the law. 167 U.S. at 419. 197 It has long been established that "[a] sentence of a court pronounced against a party without hearing him, or giving him an opportunity to be heard, is not ajudicial determination of his rights, and is not entitled to respect in any other tribunal. "constitutional limitations upon the power of courts, even in aid of their own valid processes, to dismiss an action without affording a party the opportunity for a hearing on the merits of his cause."' 9 8
In a civil forfeiture suit where the fugitive claimant is disentifled, the court effectively transfers the claimant's property to the complainant (i.e., the Government) by denying the claimant the right to be heard. 19 9 Those circuit courts that allow fugitive disentitlement rely on the relationship of the disputed property to the alleged crime.
However, relatedness is precisely what a hearing in a forfeiture action is intended to determine. 2 0 ' Without a hearing, the only evidence of relatedness is the Government's allegation. 2 0 2 Thus, "with artful pleading, the government could confiscate all of a fugitive's property ... all on mere allegation." 20 3 Merely by asserting that the claimant is a fugitive and that the property is somehow associated with the suspected crime from which he has escaped, the Government can bar a claimant from defending his property. 20 4 When this happens, "the status quo is altered, property is redistributed, and all without any hearing whatsoever on the merits of the case." 201 In issuing a seizure warrant, the magistrate judge determines if there is probable cause to believe that there is some connection between the real property and the suspected crime-i.e., that the property was used, or intended to be used, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, a crime. United States v. James Daniel Good, 510 U.S. 43, 55 (1993 [Vol. 87
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tional guarantee of due process of law affords nothing more than the opportunity to be heard is to belittle that right and to engage in a frivolous game of semantics. 20 8 Given that the essential purpose of the prior hearing requirement is "to prevent unfair and mistaken deprivations of property... it is axiomatic that the hearing must provide a real test" of the merits of the claim.
9
As recently as 1993,210 the Supreme Court rejected the validity of ex parte pre-seizure hearings regarding temporary seizure of property pending a full forfeiture hearing. 2 1 ' The Court held that such a hearing failed to preserve the rights of the unrepresented party who risked losing his property because the Government was not required to present evidence or possible defenses. 21 2 If a probable cause warrant, issued ex parte, is not adequate to temporarily deprive an owner of the use of his property, then "clearly it is an insufficient basis on which to justify a permanent loss [of that property] by forfeiture." 2 13 In Brian Degen's case, the district court permitted the Government to confiscate millions of dollars worth of his property without ever affording him any hearing on his defenses. Degen alleged that all of the property was lawfully acquired by him through legitimate labor, 21 4 but the lower court never allowed Degen to present these arguments. 210 See United States v.James Daniel Good, 510 U.S. 43, 62 (1998) ("[T]he Due Process Clause requires the Government to afford notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before seizing real property subject to civil forfeiture.").
211 "The neutrality afforded by an adversary hearing is of particular importance ... where the Government has a direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of the proceeding." Id at 55-56.
212 The Court noted that the "ex parte preseizure proceeding affords little or no protection to the innocent owner. In issuing a warrant of seizure, the magistrate judge need determine only that there is probable cause to believe that the real property was [used, or intended to be used, in the commission of a crime]." Id. at 55.
213 United States v. $40,877.59 in United States Currency, 32 F.d 1151, 1155 (7th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added). 214 In a joint opposition motion, Brian and Karyn Degen explained in detail that the properties seized by the Government had not been purchased with money from illegal drug trafficking. The Degens offered documentary evidence of several legitimate income sources: profits from real estate and construction ventures, rental income from real estate and business properties, profits from their storage business in Hawaii, Karyn's inheritance money, and capital contributions and investments from Brian's parents. Petitioner's Brief at 4, Degen v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1777 Ct. (1996 (No. 95-173) . 215 Having concluded that Brian Degen was disentitled, the district court "refused to consider petitioner's 'many pages' of detailed and well-documented 'assertions that he acquired the property in question with legitimate funds,' explaining that those claims 'may erty without a hearing. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision, so Brian Degen will eventually be heard on remand. However, because the Court did not issue an outright prohibition of fugitive disentitlement in civil forfeiture cases, lower courts are still able to deny a fugitive his due process right to be heard, simply by virtue of the disentitlement doctrine.
Disentitlement and Due Process in the Criminal and Civil Contexts
In a criminal case, the Government cannot obtain a conviction based solely on the absence of the defendant-i.e., a judgment of guilty by default solely because of the defendant's fugitive status. 21 6 The defendant may be tried in absentia, but there is a trial and the Government still must prove its case. 2 17 In addition, the fugitive's attorney may participate fully in the proceeding, by, for example, rebutting evidence, presenting additional exculpatory evidence and making arguments. 2 1 8 Likewise, the Government should not be permitted to foreclose representation of a civil claimant and to obtain a civil forfeiture based wholly on the failure of the claimant to appear in a distinct but related criminal case. Striking the defendant's answer in the civil case "would be as flagrant a violation of the rights of the citizen as [striking the defendant's answer in the criminal case]; the one as pointedly as the other would convert the judicial department of the government into an engine of oppression, and would make it destroy great constitutional safeguards." 21 9 The Government could hardly disentitle Brian Degen from defending the criminal case against him or demand that the trial court enter a defaultjudgment. If a petitioner cannot be disentitled in the very case in which he is allegedly a fugitive, how can he reasonably be disentitled in a separate forfeiture action in which he is entirely prepared to participate?
The concerns at issue in examining disentitlement in civil versus criminal cases become even more troubling when comparing the doctrine's application to criminal appeals versus civil forfeitures. In the criminal context, the defendant is merely deprived of a right to review a criminal conviction, whereas, in the civil context, the government deprives a forfeiture claimant of any hearing at all.
Defending a claim against one's property is a fundamental due well be true' but could not be considered because Degen was barred from offering any defense." Id. process right. 2 20 By contrast, the convicted criminal has no constitutional right to an appeal. 22 1 When an appellate court applies the doctrine in a criminal case, it refuses to review the substance of the district court'sjudgment. Presumptively, thatjudgment was arrived at after a full and fair hearing: The fugitive defendant already was granted due process of law. 22 2 In most civil forfeiture actions, on the other hand, the fugitive has not been convicted of, or even arrested for, a crime. 2 23 Additionally, the forfeiture action is not the same proceeding as the one from which claimant has fled.
224
For instance, when the district court ordered his claim stricken, Brian Degen had not been convicted of any crime, much less one related to the ownership of his property. 225 It was immaterial that the Government happened to file both the criminal charges and the civil forfeiture suit against Degen in the same judicial district. Degen was denied his day in court and his constitutional right to due process.
Denying the escaped defendant an opportunity to appeal after a full trial is entirely different from denying a civil claimant all rights to his seized property solely because of his voluntary absence from a criminal case. In the latter situation, not only does the claimant lose the presumption of innocence with regards to a crime for which he has not been tried, but the Government does not even have to prove its forfeiture case. The court essentially renders a judgment without consideration of the evidence. 222 $40,877.59, 32 F.3d at 1156 ("The fugitive has already had an opportunity for due process to safeguard thejudgment which found him guilty."). 
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tinue to occur until the Supreme Court disallows application of the disentiflement doctrine in any civil forfeiture action.
B. INAPPLICABILITY OF RATIONALES FOR THE DOCTRINE TO CIVIL
FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS
The Court in Degen correctly discounted various principles offered in support of Brian Degen's disentitlement, stating that disentiflement constituted an unreasonable response to Degen's absence from the country.
2 27 The traditional rationales for the doctrine as applied in the criminal appellate context 228 do not translate to the civil context. They are inapplicable, and indeed wholly inappropriate, in the civil forfeiture setting.
The Enforceability of the Court's Judgment
The criminal defendant who flees from justice during the pendency of his appeal cannot be forced to submit to the appellate court's judgment. 2 29 The fugitive-appellant effectively can reap the benefits from a favorable adjudication of his appeal, but can choose to avoid the consequences of an adverse adjudication. 2 30 By contrast, the civil claimant's fugitive status "does not threaten the integrity of the forfeiture proceeding. '23 1 Nor does it jeopardize the enforceability of the court's eventual decision. 23 2 Because the property is wholly within the court's control, a claimant's absence does not block the government's access to seizable assets. 23 3 In the event a judgment is rendered in favor of the Government, the fugitive suffers the effects of an adverse adjudication.
Promoting the Efficient Operation of the Judicial Process and Protecting the Dignity of the Court
The fugitive disentiflement doctrine was originally designed to ensure orderly and efficient judicial procedure. 244 In applying the doctrine, some courts focus on the fugitive's defiance of the legal system and on the delay caused by his escape. However, the supervisory capacity of the federal courts to apply the doctrine is necessarily limited in scope.
2 45 Because it is grounded in a court's power to control its docket and its proceedings, 24 6 when a court invokes the doctrine, the fugitive's status must be somehow related to the ongoing proceedings.
2 4 7 If the fugitive's status does not have the requisite "connection"-i.e., it neither affects the court's ability to carry out its judicial business nor prejudices the government as a litigant-the claim may not be dismissed.
8
The critical question is "what disruption, if any, the fugitive's absence has on the integrity of the sanctioning court's own processes." 249 When an individual appeals his criminal conviction while he is a fugitive, there is an obvious connection between his fugitive status and the appellate proceedings. 2 50 By contrast, a claimant's failure to appear in a civil forfeiture proceeding has no institutional effect on the court 25 1 Nor does a claimant's alleged fugitive status in a separate criminal case against him "threaten the integrity of the forfeiture proceeding." 252 In a forfeiture proceeding, the claimant's who absconded after being granted certiorari to review their convictions. Id. The Court explained that its precedents involved situations where a fugitive defendant is the party seeking review:
In those very different cases, dismissal of the petition or appeal is based on the equitable principle that a fugitive from justice is "disentitled" to call upon this Court for a review of his conviction. This equitable principle is wholly irrelevant when the defendant has had his conviction nullified and the government seeks review here. Id. at 681-82 n.2 (citations omitted). 244 
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presence is not "needed to conduct an adversarial hearing, and it could not be compelled in a civil action even if he were not a fugitive."253
The forfeiture action against Brian Degen easily could have proceeded in his absence with virtually no impact on the district court's processes: The Government could have propounded interrogatories and depositions by telephone, or gone to Switzerland to do so; the Court could have heard argument for both parties without Degen being physically present; and Degen would have had to abide by whatever outcome resulted. Alternatively, constitutional considerations far outweigh the concern that the forfeiture claimant disrupts the judicial process merely by responding to the Government's attempts at seizure. 2 5 5 The Constitution recognizes "higher values than speed and efficiency ....
[T]he Due Process Clause ... [was] designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize . .. government officials
"256
Another underlying rationale for the disentitlement doctrine consistently cited by the Court is the desire to protect the courts' dignity and to engender respect. When a criminal appellant disappears while his appeal is pending, he flouts the authority of both the trial court and the court adjudicating his appeal. In the civil forfeiture context, a property owner's fugitive status in a separate criminal case does not offend the dignity of the civil forfeiture court's proceedings.
2 57 The disentitlement doctrine operates to protect the dignity of the court with respect to a particular case. 25 8 The Supreme Court has made clear that a fugitive cannot be disentitled in one proceeding simply because his status may have affected a completely different proceeding. 255 General adjudication of a case on its merits requires expenditure of time, effort and money, but these costs cannot be deemed to outweigh the constitutional right to a prior hearing. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90-91 n.22 (1972) .
256 Id. ("Procedural due process is not intended to promote efficiency or accommodate all possible interests: it is intended to protect the particular interests of the person whose possessions are about to be taken.").
257 Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234, 246 (1993) (noting that the petitioner, who fled before sentencing and was recaptured before appeal, flouted the authority of the district court, not the court of appeals).
258 See id. (declining to disentitle defendant because his flight had no connection to course of appellate proceedings).
259 In Ortega-Rodriguez, the Court explained:
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Even if one accepts the notion that the fugitive's conduct constitutes an affront to the forfeiture court, there remain less severe alternatives to disentitlement. Indiscriminate application of the doctrine as punishment for any misconduct is extreme: "[1] t is a greater stain on our jurisprudence for the court ... to discard those procedures that safeguard right and fair decisions." 260 As Justice Kennedy noted in Degen, the judicial system earns respect and dignity not through oppressive implementation of its rules, but through fair and considered judgment on the merits of any claim. 26 ' (1996) . The Degen decision reflected the Court's philosophy in Ortega-Rodriguez, where it rejected an expansion of the disentiflement doctrine that would allow a court "to sanction by dismissal any conduct that exhibited disrespect for any aspect of the judicial system, even where such conduct has no connection to the course of [the sanctioning court's] proceedings." Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 U.S. at 246. In a recent decision, the Supreme Court noted that "'genuine respect, which alone can lend true dignity to our judicial establishment, will be engendered, not by the fear of unlimited authority, but by the firm administration of the law through those institutionalized procedures which have been worked out over the centuries. ' The Degen Court's cursory overview of the concept indicates skepticism as to its import in a civil forfeiture action. A person who declines to come to the United States to face criminal charges has not committed an offense against the disentitling court. As such, there is no wrongful conduct to deter.
The Threat of Dismissal Deters Escape From Justice
Assuming arguendo that the doctrine does influence a claimant's decision to flee, disentitlement is nevertheless a draconian deterrence method. Use of disentitlement is especially troubling given the wide range of alternatives available to the district court 26 5 As the Degen Court acknowledged, "the need to deter flight from criminal prosecution by Degen and others... [is] substantial, but disentitlement is too blunt an instrument for advancing them."
266
In conclusion, the justifications for the disentitlement doctrine in the criminal appeals setting do not apply in the civil forfeiture context. Admittedly, federal courts are vested with supervisory authority to formulate procedural rules not necessarily required by the Constitution or Congress. 2 67 However, " [e ] ven a sensible and efficent use of the supervisory power.., is invalid if it conflicts with constitutional... provisions." 268 As employed in civil forfeiture actions, the disentiflement doctrine violates a panoply of rights conferred by the Constitution. As such, none of the above rationales for the disentitlement doctrine-assuming for argument's sake that any is applicable-can justify its invocation in civil forfeiture proceedings. And, none can excuse deployment of the court's inherent powers in derogation of constitutional rights.
The Degen Court's equivocal stance on these issues signified acquiescence to the lower federal courts' overly broad application of the disentitlement doctrine where it does not belong. By avoiding outright proscription of disentitlement in civil forfeiture, the Degen Court gave credence to the expansion of the doctrine from the criminal appeal to the civil forfeiture context. 264 Collins, supra note 38, at 649 ("As to the claim that more suspects will flee due to this approach, it simply does not follow that guaranteeing a defendant his due process rights will encourage his flight.").
265 The Court has noted that, while a case is pending before the district court, there are numerous penalties the threat of which would deter flight. Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 U.S. at 247. See also Katz v. United States, 920 F.2d 610, 613 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that the "disentitlement doctrine does not stand alone as a deterrence to escape"). 
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C. BASIC CONCEPTS OF FAIRNESS
Application of the disentiflement doctrine in civil forfeiture actions, where the government already has a substantial advantage over claimants, is inherently unfair. 2 69 To seize a fugitive's property, the Government only has to show probable cause to believe that the property at issue is related to the alleged illegal activity. 270 The burden then shifts to the claimant who must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the property is not thus connected. 27 ' The imbalance is magnified when courts invoke the fugitive disentitlement doctrine to bar any challenges to the Government's assertions. 272 This permits the Government to avoid even its slight burden and strips the claimant of an opportunity to defend against a possibly unfair seizure. Preventing a claimant from asserting a defense allows the Government to confiscate property on the mere allegation that the claimant is a fugitive and the property is somehow related to criminal activity.
2 73 Under the doctrine as formulated by the lower courts, when a criminal indictment is filed and the defendant fails to appear, the floodgates open. The sole barrier to the Government's acquisition of unlimited power-a property owner's right to defend against unwarranted forfeiture-is eliminated. Where disentitlement occurs, no court examines whether the Government seized property to which it has no legal right. As such, the Government can easily abuse the doctrine to avoid judicial scrutiny of the soundness of its allegations and the merits of its case. The Government deprives the fugitive of property "not by establishing probable cause in a courtroom, not by overcoming petitioner's defenses, and not even in compliance with the due process standards for pre-deprivation seizures." 274 The Supreme Court, however, has emphasized that fairness must 269 United States v. $40,877.59 in United States Currency, 32 F.3d 1151, 1156 (7th Cir.) (noting unfairness of applying doctrine to civil forfeitures since the Government "enjoys a tremendous procedural advantage under the forfeiture laws").
270 Brian Degen's property was seized on the basis of minimal evidence that it was illegally used or obtained. The Government's initial complaint was supported by only one affidavit of a Drug Enforcement Agency agent, which was filled with hearsay statements from unnamed confidential informants. See Petitioner's Brief at 3, Degen v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1777 (1996) (No. 95-173) . Courts have acknowledged that this low standard of proof increases the chance for governmental abuse in the "amount or type or property seized, the limited amount of evidence establishing that a crime has been committed, and the effect on innocent owners." Collins, supra note 38, at 634. In United States v. Lopez-Aguilar, 28 1 a New York district court cited Degen for two propositions: 1) the disentitlement doctrine provides that a fugitive loses the right to call upon the resources of the courts for determination of his claim; and 2) the doctrine applies to more contexts than direct criminal appeals.
82
The Iowa Supreme Court considered the disentitlement doctrine in State v. Dyer 28" Citing Degen, the court dismissed a defendant's appeal from criminal charges of furnishing intoxicants to inmates of the Iowa Department of Corrections following the defendant's flight from jurisdiction. The Degen decision does not support the theories advanced by the New York and Iowa courts. The spirit of the Degen holding is that no necessity justifies the harsh sanction of disentitlement in civil forfeiture actions. 2 8 5 However, the Court's ambivalent articulation of this principle left open the possibility that striking a claimant's argument in a civil forfeiture suit for his fugitive status in a criminal prosecution would be acceptable in some circumstances.
VI. CONCLUSION
Before Degen, the Supreme Court had approved use of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine only as a shield to enable a court to deflect the affirmative claims of those who flout the court's processes in the same matter. 28 6 The doctrine was not intended by the Court to act as a sword, used offensively by the Government to bypass scrutiny of the merits of its case.
By invoking the doctrine in civil forfeiture proceedings, the Government essentially blackmails the claimant: he is forced to submit to arrest in exchange for the right to defend himself against litigation. The Court must not permit the disentitlement doctrine to be used (and abused) in such a way as to sweep away fundamental due process rights. These constitutional conflicts do not arise when the doctrine is confined to its traditional setting-i.e., criminal appeals. Therefore, the Degen Court should have prohibited its application altogether in civil forfeiture proceedings. There is no legitimate basis for the doc- 
